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Abstract
This paper is concerned with information revelation in single-item auctions. We compute how much data needs to be
transmitted in three strategically equivalent auctions—the Vickrey auction, the English auction and the recently proposed
bisection auction—and show that in the truth-telling equilibrium the bisection auction is the best performer.
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1. Introduction
A classical challenge of auction design is to de-
velop mechanisms that have an implementation in
weakly dominant strategies resulting in an efﬁcient
allocation. Due to the Revelation Principle, focus has
mainly been on direct revelation mechanisms. In the
private value environment the challenge is considered
to be solved since the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves direct
mechanism implements the efﬁcient allocation and is
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incentive-compatible [1,5,10]. However, by construc-
tion, implementation of a strategy in a direct mecha-
nism requires elicitation of complete and exact pref-
erence information.
Recognitionoftheelicitationproblemhasprompted
researchers to examine the trade-off between com-
munication and allocation efﬁciency. For the case of
combinatorial auctions, it has been recognized that full
revelation of bidders’ preferences may require a pro-
hibitive amount of communication [7]. For the case of
single-item auctions, the effect on allocative efﬁciency
of a severe restriction of the amount of communication
allowed is studied in Nisan and Blumrosen [6]. This
paper considers the case where each bidder is only al-
lowed to send a single t-bit message to the auctioneer,
who must then allocate the object and determine the492 E. Grigorieva et al. / Operations Research Letters 34 (2006) 491–498
price according to the messages received. The authors
determinetheoptimalauctionandshowthatthelossof
efﬁciency incurred relative to unconstrained auctions
is mild. In Rothkopf and Harstad [8] similar questions
are considered when bids are restricted to discrete
levels in oral auctions. In particular, it is shown that
for private values independently drawn from the uni-
form distribution the expected economic inefﬁciency
is approximately proportional to the square of the
increment.
In this paper, we are concerned with the issue of
information (bidders’ valuation) revelation and cor-
responding communication requirements of efﬁcient
incentive-compatible auctions for the case of selling a
single indivisible object under private values. We will
compare communication performance of three strate-
gically equivalent auctions—the Vickrey auction, the
English auction and the recently proposed bisection
auction [4]. Under the Vickrey auction bidders are
allowed to submit one single sealed bid. The bidder
with the highest bid is declared to be the winner. He
gets the object for a price equal to the second-highest
bid that is made. In the English auction the auctioneer
calls successively higher prices. Initially all bidders
are active and, as the auctioneer raises the price,
they decide when to drop out. No bidder who has
dropped out can become active again. The number of
active bidders as well as their bids are not publicly
known at any time. The last bidder to remain is the
winner and he pays the ﬁnal ask price. The rules of
the bisection auction will be presented later in the
paper.
As Vickrey showed in [10], the Vickrey auction and
the above variant of the English auction, are strategi-
cally equivalent. In [4] it is shown that the bisection
auction is strategically equivalent to the Vickrey auc-
tion (and therefore, also to the English auction). Con-
sequently, for these three auctions it holds that truth-
telling is a weakly-dominant strategy, independent of
the prior distribution of bidders’ valuations, the num-
ber of bidders, or their risk attitude. Moreover, the re-
sulting truth-telling equilibrium is efﬁcient, meaning
that the object gets assigned to the bidder who val-
ues it most. But the information about bidders’ valu-
ations that needs to be revealed to the auctioneer in
order to decide on the allocation and the payment is
different for these auctions. In the truth-telling equi-
librium all valuations in the Vickrey auction and all
but the highest valuation in the English auction are re-
vealed to the auctioneer with a precision up to the very
last digit. This is not necessarily a desirable feature
of these auction formats. Bidders might be reluctant
to truthfully reveal their full private value if there will
be subsequent auctions or negotiations in which the
information revealed can be used against them. Such
considerations lead to an interest in auctions where
bidders need not reveal their information entirely but
only partially [2,9]. That is indeed what happens in
the bisection auction. There only a bidder with the
second highest valuation reveals his valuation, some-
thing that is inevitable in a Vickrey implementation
[3]. It means that the bisection auction is economical
in its demand for information. It elicits much less in-
formation about bidders’ valuations than the Vickrey
and English auctions but still enough to guarantee an
efﬁcient allocation.
The primal contribution of this paper is to analyze
precisely the communication complexity associated
with the revelation of bidders’valuations in these three
auctions. Communication complexity is measured by
the number of information bits that bidders should
transmit during the auctions in the truth-telling equi-
librium. By a bit, we mean the smallest unit of infor-
mation used by a computer, either 0 or 1. We ﬁnd that
in expectation the corresponding number in the bisec-
tion auction is far less than in the Vickrey and English
auctions. In order to show this, we derive formulas
for the expected number of information bits in these
auctions with n players whose valuations are integer
numbers uniformly and independently drawn from the
interval [0,2R) for some positive integer R. While we
ﬁnd that in the Vickrey auction Rn information bits
and in the English auction at least 1
3 n2R information
bits are to be transmitted, it turns out that the bisec-
tion auction requires transmission of at most 2n + R
information bits.
2. The bisection auction
Suppose a single indivisible object is auctioned.
Bidders’ valuations are supposed to be integer, ran-
domly drawn from a bounded interval—by default of
the form [0,2R) for some positive integer R. The bi-
sectionauctionhasRrounds.Thepricesequencestarts
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to 2R−1. (Instead of choosing the middle of the inter-
val one may chose any integer inside the interval. In
particular, in case of not uniformly distributed valu-
ations one should choose the median in order to let
the analysis of Section 3.1 go through.) Bidders re-
port their demand at the current price by sealed bids.
A yes-bid stands for the announcement to be willing
to buy at the current price, a no-bid for the contrary.
As a function of these bids, the auctioneer announces
the price of the next round.
In case there are at least two players submitting a
yes-bid, the price goes up to the middle of the upper
half interval, i.e., the interval [2R−1,2R). The players
that are allowed to participate actively in the next
round are the ones that said yes and they are compet-
ing for the object in the price range [2R−1,2R). The
other players drop out of the auction and no longer
have any inﬂuence on the proceedings of the auction.
In case there is at most one player saying yes, atten-
tion shifts to the lower half interval, i.e. the interval
[0,2R−1) and the price goes down to the middle of
this interval. Two different things can happen now.
First, the easy case, if no-one has submitted a yes-bid.
In that case, all active players remain active in the
next round. In the other case there is a single player
that submitted a yes-bid. This player now becomes
the winner and he gets the object. Nevertheless the
auction does not end, but enters a price-determination
phase. The active players in the next round are the
ones that were active in the previous round minus
the winner. In order to keep active players moti-
vated to participate in the auction they should not get
to know that the object has already been assigned.
Therefore, we assume that bidders are not able to ob-
serve bids of the others. The remaining active players
are competing on the lower half interval [0,2R−1).
The winner, although he is no longer considered to be
active, is considered to say yes to all prices that are
proposed beyond the moment he became the winner.
After all, all these prices will be lower than the price
he agreed to when he became the winner. Apart from
this, the way it is decided whether the price should
go up or down is not any different from the way
this is decided in the winner-determination phase. In
each round depending on submitted bids we subse-
quently restrict attention to either the lower half of
the current interval, or to the upper half of the current
interval.
Iterating this procedure will eventually yield a win-
ner and a price. In the case when in no round precisely
one player said yes, several players will still be active
after R rounds, and the object is assigned by a lottery
to one of them. The price is uniquely determined be-
cause in each round the length of the current interval
goes down by a factor of two. Since the initial interval
is of length 2R, after R rounds the resulting interval
is of length 1. And since it is a half-open interval, it
contains exactly one integer. This integer is declared
to be the price the winner of the auction has to pay
for the object.
Example. This example illustrates how the bisection
auction works. Suppose there are four bidders, A, B,
C, and D, with the following integer private valuations
from the interval [0,16): 11, 7, 15, 9. To determine
the winner and the price in this setting the bisection
auction takes four rounds and starts with an ask price
equal to 8. Suppose that each bidder chooses to re-
spond truthfully and follows a straightforward strategy
under which he says yes if an ask price is less than or
equal to his valuation and no otherwise. Bidders are
not informed about other bidders’ choices. The bisec-
tion auction proceeds as follows.
Round Price Lower Upper Bidder Bidder Bidder Bidder
bound bound ABCD
1 8 0 16 yes no yes yes
2 12 8 16 no – yes no
3 10 8 12 yes – (yes) no
4 11 10 12 yes – (yes) –
Since three bidders submitted yes-bids in the ﬁrst
round, the price increases to the middle of the current
price and the current upper bound. So the ask price
of the second round is 12. These three bidders remain
active while bidder B drops out. Since there is only
one yes-bid in the second round we have a winner and
we enter what we call the price determination phase.
From now on, the winner, bidder C, is considered to
say yes. Players A and D are still active. In the third
round, there are two yes-bids so the price increases.
Player D drops out. In the fourth round, the auction
terminates. Taking into account bids made during
the last round we compute the ﬁnal lower and upper
bounds. Since there were 2 yes-bids the upper bound
remains to be 12 while the lower bound becomes494 E. Grigorieva et al. / Operations Research Letters 34 (2006) 491–498
11. The winner, bidder C, takes the object and pays
price 11 which is the smallest Walrasian price for the
demand announced by the bidders that participated in
this auction.
3. Information revelation and data transmission
in the auctions
Because of the strategic equivalence with the
Vickrey and English auctions shown in [4] we know
that telling the truth in the bisection auction is an equi-
librium in weakly dominant strategies. This allows
us to compare for all three auctions the information
bidders are required to reveal about their valuations in
equilibrium. We will show that the bisection auction
is more economical in its demand for information
regarding valuations of the players than the Vickrey
and the English auctions.
The tool we use to measure revelation of infor-
mation is the amount of data that gets transmitted in
equilibrium. Notice that the fact that we have truth
telling in equilibrium indeed allows us to identify
revelation of information with data transmission. We
calculate and compare the expected number of in-
formation bits that are to be transmitted by players
before the auctioneer can decide upon allocation
and payment in the Vickrey, English and bisection
auctions.
3.1. Data transmission in the bisection auction
In this subsection, we present an implementation of
the bisection auction that requires players to transmit
at most 2n + R information bits.
The initial ask price is known to all players before
the auction starts. During a round with an ask price
pr each active player submits a bid 0 or 1 where 0
stands for the statement “My valuation is less than
pr” and 1 stands for the contrary. So, during a round
each active player sends a single bit of information
to the auctioneer. We do not require inactive players
to submit bids since the outcome of the auction does
not depend on the actions of inactive players. After
receiving bids from all active players the auctioneer
counts the number of 1’s and determines who remains
active.Toeachplayerthatparticipatedinthisroundthe
auctioneer sends a message 0 or 1 where 0 stands for
theannouncementthatthebidderisnotactiveanymore
and 1 stands for the contrary. A player that remains
active uses the information about his own previous
action to compute the price of the next round and
submits his next bid. Recall that if he said yes in the
previous round the price goes up, otherwise the price
goes down.
We calculate the expected number of information
bits to be transmitted from players to the auction-
eer during the auction. We consider the setting where
valuations of players are integer numbers drawn uni-
formly and independently from the interval [0,2R),
for some integer R. We assume that each player fol-
lows his truth-telling strategy, i.e. he submits 1 to an
ask price that is less than or equal to his true valua-
tion and 0 otherwise. From this assumption it follows
that in any round an active player submits 1 or 0 with
equal probability. Indeed, any active player in current
round r has a valuation that is uniformly distributed in
the interval between the current lower and the current
upper bound. Together with the fact that a current ask
price lies in the middle of this interval it gives us the
desired probability of 1
2.
Let EBA(n,R) denote the expected number of in-
formation bits that will be transmitted from players in
the auction of n (remaining) active players and R (re-
maining) rounds in the case where the winner is not
found yet. Similarly, by E∗
BA(n,R) we denote the ex-
pected number of information bits that will be trans-
mitted from players in the auction of n (remaining)
active players and R (remaining) rounds in the case
the winner has already been found.
First, we ﬁnd a recursive formula for EBA(n,R).
During the ﬁrst out of R remaining rounds all ac-
tive players submit bids, so that n information bits
are transmitted. Obviously, if only one round remains,
then only n bits are transmitted, so EBA(n,1) = n.
For R>1 several situations can occur. If during this
round the winner happens to be found, then n−1 ac-
tive players (everyone except the winner) and R − 1
rounds remain. The probability of this event is equal
to n(1
2)n. If during this round the winner is not found
then k active players and R − 1 rounds remain. No-
tice that if the winner is not found, the situation with
only one active player in the next round cannot occur,
so 2kn.F o rk  = n the probability that k out of n
active players say yes is P(k,n)=(n
k)(1
2)n.F o rk =n
this probability is P(n,n)=2(1
2)n (i.e. the probabilityE. Grigorieva et al. / Operations Research Letters 34 (2006) 491–498 495
that all n players say yes plus the probability that all n
players say no). Thus, for n>1 and R>1 we ﬁnd that











Now we derive a recursive formula for E∗
BA(n,R).T o
do that we consider a situation where n active play-
ers and R rounds remain in the auction and during a
previous round the winner was already found. During
the ﬁrst out of R remaining rounds all active players
submit bids, so that n information bits are transmitted
during this round. Again, if only one round remains,
then only n bits are transmitted, so E∗
BA(n,1) = n.
If only one player happens to be active he remains
active till the end of the auction and during the re-
maining R rounds exactly R bits will be submitted, so
E∗
BA(1,R)=R.F o rn>1 and R>1 several situations
can occur. Depending on the bids in this round k ac-
tive players (1kn) and R − 1 rounds remain. For
k  = n the probability that k out of n players remain
active is P(k,n)=(n
k)(1
2)n.F o rk=n this probability
is P(n,n)=2(1
2)n. Thus, for n>1 and R>1w eﬁ n d
that
E∗





We show now that both E∗
BA(n,R) and EBA(n,R)
have upper bounds that are linear in n and R.
Lemma 3.1. For any n ∈ N and R ∈ N, E∗
BA(n,R)
2n + R − 2.
Proof. The proof is by induction on R. Our induction
proposition is
P(R): for every n ∈ N:
E∗
BA(n,R)2n + R − 2.
The basis of induction, P(1), is trivial since
E∗
BA(n,1) = n2n + 1 − 2 = 2n − 1 is true for
any n ∈ N. Now suppose that the proposition
P(R − 1) is true. Take n ∈ N.I fn = 1 then we
have E∗
BA(1,R)= R2 + R − 2 = R.I fn>1 then,
using the induction hypothesis,
E∗





































































+ R − 3.
Since for any n it holds that 2n(1
2)n1w eh a v et h e
desired inequality. 
Theorem 3.2. For any integer n2 and R ∈ N,
EBA(n,R)2n + R.
Proof. The proof is by induction on R. Our induction
proposition is
P(R): for every integer n2:
EBA(n,R)2n + R.
The basis of induction, P(1), is trivial since
EBA(n,1) = n2n + 1 is true for any integer n2.
Now suppose that the proposition P(R− 1) is true.
Take an integer n2. Using the induction hypothesis
and the result of Lemma 3.1 we have























































































































(2n2 − 4n) − 1.
It is straightforward to check that f(n)=(1
2)n(2n2 −
4n)1 for any integer n1.Thus the desired inequal-
ity EBA(n,R)2n + R holds. 
So we can conclude that during the bisection auc-
tion on average not more than 2n+R bits are transmit-
ted from players to the auctioneer. Concerning a lower
bound, it is easy to see that during the bisection auc-
tion at least n+R−1 information bits are to be trans-
mitted from players to the auctioneer. Indeed, during
the ﬁrst round all n active players send a bit and there
is at least one active player during the remaining R−1
rounds.
3.2. Comparison with the English auction
The English auction starts with an ask price equal to
1. From round to round the price increases by a unit in-
crement as long as at least two players announce their
willingness to pay. Let us assume that only a synchro-
nization signal is submitted: the auctioneer communi-
cates price increments to all active players by sending
1, while he communicates the end of the auction by
sending 0. Players update their price based on this sig-
nal and send 1 to the auctioneer if they are willing to
buy at this price and 0 otherwise.
As in the bisection auction, we calculate the ex-
pected number of information bits which are to be
transmitted during the auction from players to the auc-
tioneer. Suppose that valuations of players are integer
numbers uniformly and independently drawn from
the interval [0,L)for some integer L. We assume that
all players follow their truth-telling strategies. In the
ﬁrst round with an ask price equal to 1 the probability
that a player says yes is equal to the probability that
his valuation is not equal to 0 which is (L − 1)/L.
For any player i who remains active in the next
round it holds that vi ∈[ 1,L). So, the probability of
saying yes in the second round (i.e. the probability
of having valuation not equal to 1) given that the
player is active is equal to (L − 2)/(L − 1). And
so on.
With n active players in a round there will
be 2kn active players in the next round. By
P(k,n,L) we denote the probability that exactly k
out of n active players, whose valuations are random
integer numbers from a half-open interval of length












Let EEA(n,L) denote the expected number of infor-
mation bits transmitted from players in the auction of
n active players whose valuations are random integer
numbers from a half-open interval of length L. Notice
that for L = 2, EEA(n,2) = n.F o rL3 and n2E. Grigorieva et al. / Operations Research Letters 34 (2006) 491–498 497
we ﬁnd that
















× EEA(k,L − 1).
We will use this recurrent equation to show that the av-
erage number of bits EEA(n,L) that will be transmit-
ted from players to the auctioneer has a lower bound
of 1
3Ln.
Theorem 3.3. For any integer n2 and L2,
EEA(n,L) 1
3Ln.
Proof. The proof is by induction on L. Our induction
proposition is




The basis of induction, P(2), is trivial since
EEA(n,2)=n 1
32n is true for any integer n2. Now
suppose that the proposition P(L−1) is true. Take an

































































for any L and any n2. 
To compare the communication performance of the
bisection and English auctions we look at the same
range of valuations for both auctions. So we take
interval [0,2R) and compare EBA(n,R) with
EEA(n,2R). For valuations uniformly and indepen-
dently drawn from the interval [0,2R) the bisection
auction requires from players in expectation trans-
mission of at most 2n + R information bits while
the English auction requires transmission of at least
1
32Rn bits.
It can easily be checked that for any R4 and any n
the upper bound of the expected number of bits trans-
mitted by players in the bisection auction is less than
the corresponding lower bound in the English auction.
Moreover, it can be shown that for all n and R it holds
that EBA(n,R)EEA(n,2R). From the above bounds
it is clear that the expected number of information bits
required by the English auction is exponential in the
total expected number of information bits required by
the bisection auction. Thus we can conclude that the
bisection auction requires from players in expectation
communication of far less information bits than the
English auction.
3.3. Comparison with the Vickrey auction
To compare the communication performance of the
bisection andVickrey auctions we look again at valua-
tions uniformly and independently drawn from the in-
terval [0,2R). Any valuation from this interval can be
represented using a binary encoding of length R. Sub-
mission of a valuation expressed in this way consists
of R information bits. Since during theVickrey auction
all players submit their exact valuation, this auction
of n players requires communication of Rn bits.
It can easily be shown that for any n and R the
expected number of bits EBA(n,R) transmitted from
players in the bisection auction is less than the number
Rn of corresponding bits in theVickrey auction. Thus,
we can conclude that the bisection auction requires
from players in expectation far less communication
than the Vickrey auction.
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